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Nineteenth-century author George MacDonald has influenced 
some of the greatest writers of the past century. G.K. Chesterton (1905) 
stated, “George Macdonald was one of the three or four great men of 19th 
century Britain.” He even went so far to explain, “I for one can really testify 
to a book that has made a difference to my whole existence, which helped 
me to see things in a certain way from the start; a vision of things which 
even so real a revolution as a change of religious allegiance has substantially 
only crowned and confirmed. Of all the stories I ever read . . . it remains the 
most real, the most realistic, in the exact sense of the phrase the most like 
life. It is called The Princess and the Goblin, and is by George MacDonald.” 
The Oxford Companion to Children’s Literature mentions that MacDonald’s 
Princess and Goblin books were some of J.R.R. Tolkien’s childhood 
favorites, and even suggests, “The goblin mines beneath the Misty Mountains 
in The Hobbit owe much to it” (Carpenter and Prichard 1999:427). C.S. 
Lewis, on many occasions, identified MacDonald as his literary master and 
admitted, “I fancy I have never written a book in which I did not quote from 
him” (Lewis 1947:xxxvii). Oswald Chambers went so far as to write “it is 
a striking indication of the trend and shallowness of the modern reading 
public that George MacDonald’s books have been so neglected” (Chambers 
1995:35).
While George MacDonald maintained some national and even 
international success during the later parts of his career, this changed after his 
death in 1905. Likely due to the peculiarity and complexities of his work, his 
notoriety wandered off of the edge of the literary map.  Chesterton predicted, 
“Dr. George MacDonald will be discovered some day . . . until then he will . . . 
be neglected, contemned, and quarried industriously by people who wish to 
borrow his ideas” (Chesterton 1905).
G.K. Chesterton was a prophet. In the last thirty years there has been 
resurgence in the reading and subsequent scholarly research in the work of 
George MacDonald. While there seems to be an overwhelming amount of 
research from critics of the literary as well as the theological persuasion, 
there is a striking lack of exploration from the mystical, philosophical, and 
apologetic angle. These aspects of George MacDonald’s interior life are 
usually disregarded. 
While many scholars examine MacDonald through the lens of 
literature or theology, it has yet to be found where a scholar has researched 
his mysticism in any overt detail. G.K. Chesterton wrote of MacDonald, 
“When he comes to be more carefully studied as a mystic, as I think he will 
be when people discover the possibility of collecting jewels scattered in a 
rather irregular setting, it will be found, I fancy, that he stands for a rather 
important turning-point in the history of Christendom” (2005:13). It is my 
contention that Chesterton’s suggestion has yet to be fully realized. Whether 
due to the anti-intellectualism that sometimes is associated with the study of 
“spirituality,” or due to the complex nature of MacDonald’s views, the well 
of his spiritual walk has been seldom tapped. 
Even more interestingly, the lack of scholarship on MacDonald’s 
mysticism can only be outdone by the absence of research on his underlying 
philosophical ideas. This lack of scholarship caused researcher and 
biographer Robert Trexler to write: “Not enough has been written of the 
theological and political debates of the nineteenth century, especially an 
exploration of the influence of MacDonald’s good friend and mentor, F.D. 
Maurice, who, after John Henry Newman is probably the most influential 
and prophetic theologian of the nineteenth century. However, the theological 
issues of the nineteenth century, as important and under-studied as they have 
been, still receive more attention than the philosophical debates upon which 
they rest” (Trexler 2003, italics mine). It is this missing scholarship from the 
philosophical, apologetic, and mystical angle that this study seeks to fulfill.
PART II
George MacDonald’s Philosophy and its Affect on his Mysticism
“Novalis has said: ‘Philosophy is really homesickness, an impulse 
to be at home everywhere.’ The life of a man here, if life it be, and not the 
vain image of what might be a life, is a continual attempt to find his place, 
his center of recipiency, and active agency . . . [But] he is not at home; his 
soul is astray amid people of a strange speech and a stammering tongue. But 
the faithful man is led onward; in the stillness that his confidence produces 
arise the bright images of truth; and visions of God, which are only beheld in 
solitary places, and granted to his soul.”
—George MacDonald (1895:211-12)
Chapter Two
MacDonald’s Metaphysical Foundations
Section I:  Living in a Shadow World: examining MacDonald’s 
“Temperamental Platonism”
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Section II:  Ex Deo: Origen, Plotinus and MacDonald’s view of 
Creation.
Section III:  “Participation” in the Divine Nature
Introduction
The fact that the philosophy of MacDonald has rarely been 
researched is not due to a lack of willing hearts or uneducated researchers. It 
is likely due to the fact that even a tertiary student of MacDonald recognizes 
that he had a negative attitude toward the discipline. Bruce Hindmarsh 
stated that the “One thing he [MacDonald] never claimed to be . . . was a 
theologian” (Hindmarsh 1991:55). Hindmarsh is correct, but in addition, 
MacDonald also ignored the title of “philosopher” for the same reasons. This 
researcher contends that the motives for which MacDonald disliked both 
labels was not due to the disciplines in-and-of themselves, but rather the 
outworking of these fields of study on the religious culture and the personal 
spiritual lives of those who lived in the Victorian era. Thus, MacDonald’s 
reasons for dismissing these disciplines will be elucidated, as well as his 
belief that there is, in fact, a correct theology and philosophy. 
MacDonald never publically placed himself into any theological 
or philosophical system, and his reasons were primarily preventative and 
reactionary. MacDonald himself said in a letter to his father, “I am neither 
Arminian or Calvinist. To no system could I subscribe” (Beinecke: April 
15, 1851) as well as saying “Jesus Christ is my theology, and nothing else” 
(Anonymous 2012:31). One of the reasons why he never sought to proclaim 
his systematized theology was that he was worried about being pigeonholed 
into one system of belief. He writes in his sermon entitled “Light,” “But 
if one happens to utter some individual truth which another man has made 
into one of the cogs of his system, he is in danger of being supposed to 
accept all the toothed wheels and their relations in that system” (MacDonald 
2012a:250). MacDonald was concerned about being misconstrued and 
misinterpreted, and encouraged others to also eschew choosing a system of 
belief, “Therefore, if only to avoid his worst foes, his admirers, a man should 
avoid system. The more correct a system the worse will it be misunderstood; 
its professed admirers will take both its errors and their misconceptions of its 
truths, and hold them forth as its essence” (MacDonald 1882:332).
Philosophy and theology did much during the Victorian period 
to divide and dis-unify the church until the body of Christ was barely 
recognizable. MacDonald (2012b:69) contends:
All those evil doctrines about God that work misery and madness, 
have their origin in the brains of the wise and prudent, not in the 
hearts of the children. These wise and prudent, careful to make the 
words of his messengers rime with their conclusions, interpret the 
great heart of God, not by their own hearts, but by their miserable 
intellects; and, postponing the obedience which alone can give 
power to the understanding, press upon men’s minds their wretched 
interpretations of the will of the Father, instead of the doing of that 
will upon their hearts. They call their philosophy the truth of God, 
and say men must hold it, or stand outside. They are the slaves of 
the letter in all its weakness and imperfection,—and will be until the 
spirit of the Word, the spirit of obedience shall set them free (italics 
mine).
MacDonald concluded that to choose and broadcast a specific system or 
denomination would simply cause more division and detract from the 
gospel and the mere Christianity in which he advocated. MacDonald argued 
that, “Division has done more to hide Christ from the view of men, than 
all the infidelity that has ever been spoken” (MacDonald 2009d:192). He 
specifically pointed out the issue of divisiveness within the church: “The real 
schismatic is the man who turns away love and justice from the neighbour 
who holds theories in religious philosophy, or as to church-constitution, 
different from his own; who denies or avoids his brother because he follows 
not with him; who calls him a schismatic because he prefers this or that 
mode of public worship not his” (MacDonald 2012b:80). This concept struck 
close to MacDonald’s heart, for in the middle of the 19th century a small 
schism in his church in Arundel had charged him with heresy that eventually 
caused him to resign (Raeper 1987:90). Rolland Hein summarizes succinctly, 
“MacDonald, who would ally himself with no system, scorns the sectarian 
mentality that so vehemently expends its energies in futile clashes with those 
of opposing opinions” (Hein 1989:98). MacDonald was simply concerned 
that by proclaiming a philosophical or theological system, he’d be throwing 
fuel on a fire that he longed to extinguish. 
Thirdly, MacDonald truly believed that certain theologies, as well as 
an obsession for theological deliberation, could actually detract from one’s 
relationship with the Father and one’s duty to serve him. He argued that men 
have a habit of spending too much time focusing on their theology, and not 
enough on loving God and their fellow men, “Zeal for God will never eat 
them up; why should it? He is not interesting to them: theology may be; to 
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such men religion means theology” (MacDonald 2012b:68).  MacDonald 
goes so far as to specifically state, “I firmly believe that people have hitherto 
been a great deal too much taken up about doctrine and far too little about 
practice . . .” (Greville MacDonald 2005: 155). 
Not only was MacDonald worried that an infatuation with theology 
could poorly affect our praxis, but the theology itself could be faulty, and 
thus one’s view of God could poorly influence our relationship with him.  
Rolland Hein explains, “In many novels the chief deterrent to a successful 
journey toward a spiritual maturity is contact with false ideas about God’s 
character and manner of working in the world, particularly those fostered by 
mean and popular versions of Calvinist doctrines” (Hein 1989:120). George 
MacDonald did not pull punches when it came to certain theological beliefs; 
for instance, he goes so far as calling the doctrines of atonement and eternal 
torment, “doctrines of devils” (MacDonald 2012a,179).  In Robert Falconer, 
MacDonald took aim at Calvinism, the creed of his youth: “For now arose 
within him, not without ultimate good, the evil phantasms of a theology 
which would explain all God’s doings by low conceptions, low I mean for 
humanity even, of right, and law, and justice, then only taking refuge in the 
fact of the incapacity of the human understanding when its own inventions 
are impugned as undivine. In such a system, hell is invariably the deepest 
truth, and the love of God is not so deep as hell. Hence, as foundations must 
be laid in the deepest, the system is founded in hell, and the first article in 
the creed that Robert Falconer learned was, “I believe in hell” (MacDonald 
2005:98).
There is also no doubt that MacDonald felt a calling to do damage 
to the prevailing systems of his day. One of his purposes was to “deliver the 
race from the horrors of such falsehoods, which by no means operate only 
on the vulgar and brutal, for to how many of the most refined and delicate 
of human beings are not their lives rendered bitter by the evil suggestions of 
lying systems--I care not what they are called--philosophy, religion, society, 
I care not?--to deliver men, I say, from such ghouls of the human brain, were 
indeed to have lived!” (MacDonald 2002:38).  He believed, categorically, 
that Calvinism was a barricade to one’s relationship with God. The following 
assessment will be helpful in understanding the spirit of MacDonald’s stance. 
This review of one of MacDonald’s lectures in London from a direct, albeit 
anonymous observer (Anonymous 2012:30-1), was originally published in 
Christian World in 1882: 
It is the breaking up of old habits of theological thought, or the 
exercise of a happy liberty in regard to it, that has prepared the way 
for a preacher who avows himself, as Dr. MacDonald did on Sunday, 
to be no theologian, but who feels that the truth of God is to be 
reached in other ways than by a theological key. There ought, indeed, 
to be nothing startling in this, for it is evident that souls did somehow 
find the truth of God before Christianity knew anything of scientific 
theology. That the formulating of the truth of the New Testament 
into a system has been helpful to some minds, there can be no doubt. 
But the transposing of “truth as it is in Jesus” into a system has also 
hindered some minds from getting at Christ Himself, they having 
rested in the system, and only comprehend as much of Christ as they 
could see through the system.
Thus, theological systems could cloud the lenses of one’s faith in Christ and 
MacDonald felt that it was his job to clean the lens. 
While it is obvious that he spoke negatively about these disciplines, 
and even claimed not to espouse a particular belief system, to argue that he 
did not have a philosophy or theology is simply nonsensical. Just because 
MacDonald did not like the title of “philosopher” or “theologian” does not 
mean that he was not one. If we are to take the words of Francis Schaeffer 
seriously, we should argue that all rational beings are philosophers, “No 
man can live without a worldview; therefore there is no man who is not 
a philosopher” (Schaeffer 2001:4). The central difficulty with arguing 
that MacDonald was not a theologian resides in the fact that in order for 
MacDonald to be able to point out the falsity of any system, which he did on 
many occasions, he must purport to know the truth. MacDonald argued this 
point himself in his sermon ‘The Last Farthing,’ “. . . any system which tends 
to persuade men that there is any salvation but that of becoming righteous 
even as Jesus is righteous; that a man can be made good, as a good dog is 
good, without his own willed share in the making; that a man is saved by 
having his sins hidden under a robe of imputed righteousness—that system, 
so far as this tendency, is of the devil and not of God. Thank God, not even 
error shall injure the true of heart; it is not wickedness. They grow in the 
truth, and as love casts out fear, so truth casts out falsehood” (MacDonald 
2012a:125, italics mine).
This casting out of falsehood was the first step to replacing the 
erroneous view of God with the truth. The difference between MacDonald 
and his counterparts is that he would rather the reader seek the truth on 
his own, rather than have MacDonald force-feed them his own personal 
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views. So, it is no surprise when he writes, “I know, however, that there 
were words in it which found their way to my conscience; and, let men of 
science or philosophy say what they will, the rousing of a man’s conscience 
is the greatest event in his existence” (MacDonald 2009e:173). But for 
MacDonald himself, his conscience had been raised, and he did, in fact, 
purport to have a proper philosophical and theological underpinnings. The 
simplest way of reporting this fact is to recognize when he, in fact, agreed 
with certain scholars’ points of view. He states succinctly in the Tragedie 
of Hamlet, “Note the unity of religion and philosophy in Hamlet: he takes 
the one true position” (MacDonald 1885:265). Now he does not argue 
this fact because he merely believes that Shakespeare’s Hamlet is correct 
because he aligns with MacDonald, but even more importantly, he believes 
that Hamlet aligns with God’s own philosophy. MacDonald stated, “Matter, 
time, space, are all God’s, and whatever may become of our philosophies, 
whatever he does with or in respect of time, place, and what we call matter, 
his doing must be true in philosophy as well as fact” (MacDonald 2002:424). 
Therefore, God has a philosophy, Hamlet aligned with this philosophy, 
and MacDonald understands and agrees with this alignment. But in order 
to make this assessment he must have concluded that he had the correct 
philosophical and religious position in the first place. To give another 
example of MacDonald’s affirmation of a philosophical position, take this 
passage in England’s Antiphon, “Dr. Henry More was . . . chiefly known for 
his mystical philosophy, which he cultivated in retirement at Cambridge, and 
taught not only in prose, but in an elaborate, occasionally poetic poem . . . 
Whatever may be thought of his theories, they belong at least to the highest 
order of philosophy; and it will be seen from the poems I give that they must 
have borne their part in lifting the soul of the man towards a lofty spiritual 
condition of faith and fearlessness. The mystical philosophy seems to me safe 
enough in the hands of a poet: with others it may degenerate into dank and 
dusty materialism” (MacDonald 1996:223). 
In the following pages, this researcher will proceed with the same 
spirit as MacDonald in his elevation of Dr. More’s mystical philosophy. 
Even while MacDonald occasionally downplayed the role of philosophy, 
he absolutely asked and discussed questions of a metaphysical nature. 
Adelheid Kegler goes so far to say that “MacDonald’s oeuvre is conceived 
in a dynamic and dialectic analysis of the central problems of modern 
philosophy” (Kegler 2003:19).  MacDonald elucidated his philosophical 
positions on reality, truth, and knowledge; specifically discussed in his Dish 
of Orts, as well as interweaving these ideals in his fantasy works and novels. 
Richard Reis summarizes, “MacDonald’s philosophy is, for one thing, the 
very foundation upon which his works of fiction are laid. Most writers of 
fiction, perhaps, are chiefly interested in telling a good story with skill, 
discipline and art . . . but there have been plenty of great writers . . . to whom 
their private vision of truth is primary, and who use their art as a means to 
expression of that end; and MacDonald belongs clearly with this group. 
Although MacDonald himself never really put forward his ideas as a coherent 
system, a close examination of his scattered philosophical remarks has 
convinced me that they all arise from a systematic, consistent set of beliefs” 
(Reis 1989:31). 
Section I: Living in a Shadow World: examining MacDonald’s 
‘Temperamental Platonism’ —Under the Shadow of Platonism
It is a habit of many scholars, no matter the field, to take the 
individual which they are researching and categorize his or her thought 
under the auspices of one of the great thinkers of history. This tendency is 
no different with those who study George MacDonald.  Most MacDonald 
scholars place him under the umbrella of the teachings of Plato. This comes 
as no surprise, since this is one of the few philosophers that MacDonald 
ever mentioned in his novels. It is no shock for a reader of MacDonald’s to 
stumble on a passage in which one of the main characters picked up a copy 
of Plato and read as a source of truth. For instance, in Wilfred Cumbermede 
the narrator states that the main character sat “down to my books, and 
read with tolerable attention my morning portion of Plato” (MacDonald 
2009e:232).  Yet, in the body of his fictional works you will never find 
mention of Aristotle or Augustine, Plotinus or Schleiermacher, each of 
which MacDonald had similarity and in whom he had much regard. Most 
scholars conclude that MacDonald, while he never agreed with Plato’s 
philosophy as a whole, had placed Plato on another plane of authority. Most 
notably, Stephen Prickett states directly, “MacDonald is a temperamental 
Platonist” (Prickett 2005:170).  Colin Manlove wrote, “MacDonald was a 
Platonist in his thinking . . .” (Manlove 2007:18). Frank Riga also contends 
that “MacDonald’s Christianity is also heavily marked by Platonic and 
neoplatonic elements” (Riga 1992:112). MacDonald himself writes, in a 
footnote in reference to one of John Fletcher’s poems, that therein lays “a 
glimmer of that Platonism of which, happily, we have so much more in the 
seventeenth century” (MacDonald 1996:140). But is there enough evidence 
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and conformity in the work of MacDonald to argue that he was a true 
Platonist or even a Neo-Platonist?
To begin our discussion, and to understand MacDonald’s frame of 
reference, it would do the reader well to reconsider Plato’s famous cave 
analogy: 
Plato asks us to imagine an underground cave which has an opening 
towards the light. In this cave are living human beings, with their 
legs and necks chained from childhood in such a way that they face 
the inside wall of the cave and have never seen the light of the sun. 
Above and behind them, i.e. between the prisoners and the mouth 
of the cave, is a fire, and between them and the fire is a raised way 
and a low wall, like a screen. Along this raised way there pass men 
carrying statues and figures of animals and other objects, in such 
a manner that the objects they carry appear over the top of the low 
wall or screen. They see only shadows. These prisoners represent the 
majority of man, the multitude of people who remain all their lives 
in a state of ignorance beholding only shadows of reality and hearing 
only echoes of the truth (Copleston 1993:161). 
Even the casual reader of MacDonald will see some correspondence 
between Plato’s Cave analogy and many of the themes and symbols found 
in MacDonald’s work. Most prominently is MacDonald’s unceasing 
juxtaposition of two realities: eternal and temporal. Simply stated, Kerry 
Dearborn writes, “MacDonald’s belief that the world is the antechamber of 
the greater reality of the Kingdom of God was redolent of Plato” (Dearborn 
2006:25).  Stephen Prickett argues that “this world, for him, is not a 
consistent place, but is the meeting place of two very different kinds of 
reality” (Prickett 2005:167); he continues by stating that MacDonald was 
“only interested in the surface of this world for the news it gives him of 
another, hidden reality, perceived, as it were, through a glass darkly” (Prickett 
2005:170). MacDonald agreed with Plato that this world was a conduit to a 
world of a concealed, deeper reality.
MacDonald explains his own position further, “The heavens and 
the earth are around us that it may be possible for us to speak of the unseen 
by the seen; for the outermost husk of creation has correspondence with 
the deepest things of the Creator” (MacDonald 2012a:201). Thus this 
world is part of the intimate revelation of the Father. As will be discussed 
in the subsequent section, this world is not merely a created entity, but is a 
revelation of the heart of God. This paragraph from MacDonald’s Unspoken 
Sermons (2012a:96) will elucidate his metaphysical position:
Things are given us, this body first of things, that through them we 
may be trained both to independence and true possession of them. 
We must possess them; they must not possess us. Their use is to 
mediate—as shapes and manifestations in lower kind of the things 
that are unseen, that is, in themselves unseeable, the things that 
belong, not to the world of speech, but the world of silence, not to the 
world of showing, but the world of being, the world that cannot be 
shaken, and must remain. These things unseen take form in the things 
of time and space—not that they may exist, for they exist in and 
from eternal Godhead, but that their being may be known to those in 
training for the eternal; these things unseen the sons and daughters of 
God must possess. But instead of reaching out after them, they grasp 
at their forms, reward the things seen as the things to be possessed, 
fall in love with the bodies instead of the souls of them. (italics mine)
Here he delineates between a world of “showing” and a world of “being,” 
one of which is capable of alteration and change, the other “must remain” 
and is eternal. MacDonald also makes it clear that things do not come into 
existence once they are placed in our dimension of time and space, but are 
already in existence in the eternal mind of God. In another place MacDonald 
writes, “God began to talk to us ages before we were born: I will not say 
before we began to be, for, in a sense, that very moment God thought of us 
we began to exist, for what God thinks of is” (MacDonald 1878:202). While 
it extends beyond appropriate measure to insinuate that scholars agree that 
Plato held this concept, none would disagree that Neo-Platonists such as 
Augustine unequivocally held this view (Williams 2003). Nevertheless, the 
parallel can be drawn most distinctly in the last line of the excerpt. While the 
inhabitants of Plato’s cave are continuously enamored by the shadows on the 
wall of the cave, MacDonald implores his readers not to “fall in love” with 
the earthly world, but to reach for the unseen as part of the preparation for 
our eternal destiny. 
The fact that MacDonald held to the hypothesis that there is an 
actual, unseen ideal world is undoubtedly clear as Narve Kragset Nystoyl 
claims, “One will recognize the Platonic concept of the ‘ideas’, or more 
precisely the division or contrast between our present physical world of 
senses, and a higher, more real world of ideas, of which our world is merely 
a shadow” (Nystoyl 2013:13). Manlove also concedes that MacDonald 
believed that “beyond the shifting forms of this world are certain unchanging 
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realities, which no image of them can contain” (Manlove 2007:18). 
 MacDonald’s metaphysical foundations, and the relationship between 
the realms of the seen and unseen, are also made clear in his fiction. It is no 
secret that George MacDonald often cited Novalis, most famously in the 
conclusion of Lilith where he quoted: “Our life is no dream; but it ought to 
become one, and perhaps will” (MacDonald 2009c:359).  Stephen Prickett 
notes that upon reading the quote, as well as the book as a whole, “we are 
suddenly confronted with a new existential gloss on the traditional Platonic 
belief that human life is but a dream of a greater reality” (Prickett 2005:199). 
MacDonald believed that this world, was in fact, real, but once we reach the 
world of the unseen our current world will become as a dream from which we 
have just awoken. Our cognitive reflection of this world will be reinterpreted 
by the new world, but this does not devalue our current existence. 
 David Manley argues: “The clearest image in George MacDonald’s 
fiction of how earth whispers of heaven, however, is . . . The Golden Key” 
(Manley 1998:45). While some scholars may disagree with Manley, this 
passage from MacDonald’s tale (MacDonald 2009b:193) shows a clear 
distinction between the world of the seen and the world of the unseen, while 
also using imagery redolent of Plato’s cave: 
It was a sea of shadows. The mass was chiefly made up of the 
shadows of leaves innumerable, of all lovely and imaginative forms, 
waving to and fro, floating and quivering in the breath of a breeze 
whose motion was unfelt, whose sound was unheard . . . They soon 
spied the shadows of flowers mingled with those of the leaves, 
and now and then the shadow of a bird with open beak, and throat 
distended with song . . .  For the shadows were not merely lying on 
the surface of the ground, but heaped up above it like substantial 
forms of darkness, as if they had been cast upon a thousand different 
planes of the air. Tangle and Mossy often lifted their heads and gazed 
upwards to descry whence the shadows came; but they could see 
nothing more than a bright mist spread above them, higher than the 
tops of the mountains, which stood clear against it . . .  After a while, 
they reached more open spaces, where the shadows were thinner; and 
came even to portions over which shadows only flitted, leaving them 
clear for such as might follow. Now a wonderful form, half bird-like 
half human, would float across on the country whence the shadows 
fell. “We MUST find the country from which the shadows come,” 
said Mossy. “We must, dear Mossy,” responded Tangle. “What if 
your golden key should be the key to it?” 
Thus, in Tangle and Mossy’s travels, as if executing a slow escape from 
Plato’s cave, they begin to transcend the world of shadows and approach the 
world from which the shadows come. As they travel, the shadows become 
thinner, and their hope for reaching the unseen world wells up in their hearts, 
and the prediction that the golden key is, in fact, the key to the door of this 
other world comes to fruition. Manley concedes that when “they finally 
come to the threshold of their destination, they know they are approaching 
the source of those shadows of beauty; they know they will soon ‘see face to 
face’” (Manley 1998:45). 
 This theme of “two juxtaposed worlds” (Prickett 2005:15) runs 
through many of MacDonald’s works, including Lilith. Mr. Vane, most 
strikingly, in one of his internal debates after returning from “the other 
world” (MacDonald 2009c:131) questioned, “Had I come to myself out 
of a vision?—or lost myself by going back to one? Which was the real—
what I now saw, or what I had just ceased to see? Could both be real, 
interpenetrating yet unmingling?” (MacDonald 2009c:52).  While Vane does 
not follow this with a direct answer to his own question, it can be assumed 
from the end of the story, that Vane, and thus MacDonald himself, would 
answer with a resounding “Yes”: 
“Strange dim memories, which will not abide identification, often, 
through misty windows of the past, look out upon me in the broad 
daylight, but I never dream now. It may be, notwithstanding, that, 
when most awake, I am only dreaming the more! But when I wake 
at last into that life which, as a mother her child, carries this life in 
its bosom, I shall know that I wake, and shall doubt no more. I wait; 
asleep or awake, I wait”  (2009c:359).
Both of the realities mentioned above, whether “asleep or awake,” do not 
diminish the actuality of either frame of reference. Salvey agrees with this 
assessment of MacDonald’s metaphysic in Lilith, “Both worlds are real, 
although, possibly not equally real, and both worlds are good, although 
perhaps not equally good” (Salvey 2008:25). As Salvey suggests, MacDonald 
holds that the unseen world may have heightened reality, a heightened 
goodness that’s clearly evident in this passage from Lilith, “We stood 
for a moment at the gate whence issued roaring the radiant river. I know 
not whence came the stones that fashioned it, but among them I saw the 
prototypes of all the gems I had loved on earth—far more beautiful than they, 
for these were living stones—such in which I saw, not the intent alone, but 
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the intender too; not the idea alone, but the embodier present, the operant 
outsender: nothing in this kingdom was dead; nothing was mere; nothing only 
a thing” (MacDonald 2009c:355-6). The unseen world is not a mere reflection 
of the divine creator, but, in some sense, exudes an existential presence of 
the creator that, in some way, transcends what we experience in this physical 
world. To conclude this argument, this passage from Unspoken Sermons 
demonstrates both MacDonald’s concept that the heavens are higher than 
this world, while goodness still remains in this world, “The true soul sees, or 
will come to see, that his words, his figures always represent more than they 
are able to present; for, as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are the 
heavenly things higher than the earthly signs of them, let the signs be good as 
ever sign may be” (MacDonald 2012a:174).
 A current appraisal of the research above places MacDonald firmly in 
the “metaphysical realist” camp, since these realities, whether seen or unseen, 
do not depend on the mind or the observation of man. Yet the investigation 
should not stop there. The next inquiry along the metaphysical vein is 
obvious, “What about the physical world, the world of shadows. In what way 
is it real?” 
 Once we question the metaphysical nature of these “shadows,” 
the differences between MacDonald’s view and Plato’s metaphysics 
becomes unmistakably clear. To the prisoners in Plato’s cave, elucidated in 
his Republic, “the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the 
images” (Plato 515). Plato argued that this world was merely a shadow of 
the real, eternal world of ideals, and the only goodness to be found in these 
shadows are their usage as epistemic conduits through which we can possibly 
gain knowledge of the unseen, real world. They are tools by which we find 
reality, but their metaphysical goodness beyond this function is questionable. 
The shadows are not good in and of themselves; their only good is in the 
fact that some shadows, or the “shadows of true existence” (Plato 532) are 
useful to gain true knowledge. Our observations in the physical world are 
only reflections, or  “images in the water” (Plato 532), of true reality. Even 
the cave itself, an analogy of our physical world, is not natural, but is to be 
broken free from to gain knowledge of the real world.   
 In contrast, MacDonald’s view of the physical world has intrinsic 
value, apart from its epistemic usefulness. MacDonald “does not reject and 
devalue the physical, particular embodiment of the ideal after it has been used 
as a tool for contemplating that ideal” (Salvey 2008:20). Frank Riga states 
“MacDonald’s Platonism is impure, not because he misunderstands it or 
distorts it, but because of his vision of life embraces the flesh and the material 
world in a way that a pure Platonism would not allow” (Riga 1992:126). 
Simply put, MacDonald’s Christian worldview could not accommodate 
a pure Platonism, instead his “Platonism had to be impure in order to 
accommodate the essential goodness of the flesh and its ultimate purification 
and resurrection” (Riga 1992:112). Thus, to MacDonald, even the darkness 
of Plato’s cave is not an inherent evil, but instead is “one of the constituent 
elements of reality” (Riga 1992:127). As will be discussed in the next section, 
God is the creator of this world, and his creation was, and is, inherently good.
 The goodness of this world can be most clearly observed in the 
narrative of Tangle and Mossy in The Golden Key.  Frank Riga contends: 
“The quest parallels the journey of Plato’s unchained prisoner who seeks the 
reality beyond the shadows and images of the cave. Unlike the freed prisoner, 
however, Mossy and Tangle do not discover the intelligible world of perfect 
form through philosophic meditation; instead they live an ordinary human 
life, loving the things of the world and yet dimly knowing these prefigure 
something more pleasing than either can describe.” (Riga 1992:115). Thus 
this world is “not an accident of spiritual geography or a psychological quirk, 
but a part of man’s normal condition of existence” (Prickett 2005:15). 
 In summary, Narve Kragset Nystoyl contends, “Although MacDonald 
is frequently deemed a Platonist . . . others argue that this is a difficult claim 
to make. At least, calling MacDonald a Platonist definitely stretches the 
term somewhat, as MacDonald, ever unorthodox, hardly fits the bill in all 
aspects” (Nystoyl 2013:34). In an even more specific condemnation of this 
labeling of MacDonald’s philosophy as Platonic, Robert Trexler argues, “As 
to MacDonald (or Lewis for that matter) who is sometimes called a neo-
Platonist, I do not see it fitting the truth of the matter. They both use Platonist 
imagery, shadows/caves, etc. But I think that’s just a symbolist use of those 
images . . . they are sacramentalist writers, who see nature as reflecting God’s 
truth” (Trexler 2014). While none of the scholars mentioned in this research 
would put MacDonald’s philosophy directly in line with Plato, some, like 
Robert Trexler, find far more aversion to this labeling than others. But most, 
like Roderick McGillis, admit, “Plato is never too far from MacDonald’s 
thinking” (McGillis 2008:203).
 In England’s Antiphon’s MacDonald spoke of the work of Thomas 
Heywood thusly: “He had strong Platonic tendencies, interesting himself 
chiefly however in those questions afterwards pursued by Dr. Henry More . . . 
which may be called the shadow of Platonism” (MacDonald 1996:135). As 
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MacDonald spoke of Heywood, I firmly content that we should also apply 
this to the work of MacDonald himself. While no MacDonald scholar would 
argue that he was a thorough Platonist, it has been demonstrated that he lived 
and operated under “the shadow of Platonism,” and that this terminology is 
an accurate description of MacDonald’s metaphysic. Thus, in conclusion, 
MacDonald was a metaphysical realist who openly acknowledged that he 
operated under the shadow of Platonism.
Section II:  Ex Deo: Plotinus, Origen, and MacDonald’s doctrine of  
  Creation
 A discussion of MacDonald’s doctrine of creation may seem out of 
place immediately following a study of MacDonald’s metaphysic, yet, at 
the end of this section, it will become obvious that an understanding of this 
doctrine is essential to appreciating the connection between MacDonald’s 
metaphysic and his theology. According to William Raeper, MacDonald 
believed that “men and women were born out of the heart of God, not Ex 
Nihilo as traditionally held by the church, and thus MacDonald aligned 
himself with the Neo-Platonic theories of Plotinus and Origen” (Raeper 
1987:243). Here again, MacDonald operated under the shadow of Plato; 
thus not only will MacDonald’s view be explored, but also be compared and 
contrasted with the neo-platonic doctrines of Plotinus and Origen. 
 It is believed by most scholars that in the second and third century 
A.D Ammonius Saccas of Alexandria taught his students the rudimentary 
knowledge of what will later be dubbed Neo-Platonism. While not much 
is known of Ammonius since he has no extant writings, there is no doubt, 
simply by an understanding of his students’ teachings, that he subscribed to 
the teachings of Plato, or at least a personal interpretation thereof (Riddle 
2008:46).  This Platonic influence manifested itself into two of his most 
influential students: Origen and Plotinus.
 While Origen did hold to a creation of matter Ex Nihilo (De 
Principiis II.1.5), one can quickly see the Platonic influence on his view of 
creation in his Commentary on John, “We must ask about this; whether, when 
the saints were living a blessed life apart from matter and from any body, the 
dragon, falling from the pure life, became fit to be bound in matter and in a 
body, so that the Lord could say, speaking through storm and clouds, This 
is the beginning of the creation of God, made for His angels to mock at” 
(I.17). Similarly to Plato, Origen held to a pre-existence of the soul before 
the placement of that soul into matter. Before this physical world began, we 
lived in a spiritual realm with God, and originally “He created all whom He 
made equal and alike” (De Principiis II.9.6). It was only through the free 
will of these rational creatures that diversity had been caused. (De Principiis 
II.9.6). It’s also likely that Origen believed in an infinite regress of ever-
recurring existences, which falls in-line with Plato’s contention that the world 
is coeternal with the Demiurgos. Origen writes: “We say that not then for 
the first time did God begin to work when He made this visible world; but 
as, after its destruction, there will be another world, so also we believe that 
others existed before the present came into being” (De Principiis III.5.3).
 Where Origen’s doctrine of creation intrigues the devotees of 
MacDonald is where he dips his toes into the pool of emanationism. But, 
unlike Plotinus and MacDonald who chronologically followed him, Origen 
only suggests creation Ex Deo for God alone. John Riddle explains, “Origen’s 
theory of emanation, derived from Plato, provided imagery that could help 
explain how the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit could be one God in three 
persons” (Riddle 2008: 46).   Origen explains in his Commentary on the 
Gospel of John,  “One might assert, and with reason, that God Himself is the 
beginning of all things, and might go on to say, as is plain, that the Father 
is the beginning of the Son; and the demiurge the beginning of the works of 
the demiurge, and that God in a word is the beginning of all that exists . . . In 
the Word one may see the Son, and because He is in the Father He may be 
said to be in the beginning” (I.17). Thus, in his view, Jesus emanated from 
the Father, and the Holy Spirit originated in Christ. Origen explains, “But 
we for our part are convinced that there are three distinct existents-Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit- and we do not believe any of these is unbegotten except 
the Father” (Wiles 2001:78). Of course, this would more than ruffle a few 
feathers of third century theologians, especially when Origen argued that 
the “Holy Spirit was brought into being through the Word [Christ], and the 
Word is senior to him” (Wiles 2001:78). Thus implying that there was a true 
ontological subordination in the Trinity. While Origen’s ideas lead to heresy 
in the early church, there is the grounding of emanationism, which leads us to 
another one of Ammonius’ students: Plotinus.
 Plotinus’ concept of emanationism was not limited to the divine, 
but branched out into all creation. Norman Geisler states categorically 
“Plotinus’ God created the world Ex Deo (out of himself) out of a necessary 
and emanational unfolding and not Ex Nihilo (out of nothing)” (Geisler  
2003:153).  In Plotinus’ own words: “the One is perfect and . . . has 
overflowed, and its exuberance has produced the new” (Enneads V.2.1). 
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For the uninitiated, many would take Plotinus’ ideas to directly lead to 
pantheism, but this is not the case, especially in the strict sense of the word. 
He elucidates his position, “The One is all things and no one of them; the 
source of all things is not all things; all things are its possession—running 
back, so to speak, to it—or, more correctly, not yet so, they will be” (V.2.1). 
The fact of the matter is that Plotinus’ “One,” while a complex idea, is an 
ontologically simple and an utterly inexplicable source. The One produces 
its effect, but the effect is different from its begetter due to the complexity 
of the creation,  “For the Universe is not a Principle and Source: it springs 
from a source, and that source cannot be the All or anything belonging to the 
All, since it is to generate the All, and must be not a plurality but the Source 
of plurality, since universally a begetting power is less complex than the 
begotten” (III.8.9).  Plotinus also states more simply: “the produced thing is 
deficient by the very addition, by being less simplex, by standing one step 
away from the Authentic” (II.6.1).  Brandon Zimmerman explains, “There is 
an ontological gulf between the One and all modes of being that are derived 
from him, a gulf which words and concepts cannot bridge. Plotinus often 
expresses this paradoxically by saying that the One is all things in that they 
come from him, and is nothing in that he is none of the beings that come from 
him and has none of the limiting characteristics of a being or a substance” 
(Zimmerman 2009:15-6). 
 Plotinus did ask himself, “From such a unity as we have declared 
The One to be, how does anything at all come into substantial existence, 
any multiplicity, dyad, or number?” (V.1.6).  In laymen terms, ‘How did the 
One create?” It becomes clear in his fifth Ennead that the One produces the 
Divine Mind, or the Intellectual-Principle or Nous, which he stated, “stands 
as the image of The One” (V.1.7). Then this mind, since it is not devoid of 
creativity like the One, produces the soul. Plotinus explains, “What is left is 
the phase of the soul which we have declared to be an image of the Divine 
Intellect, retaining some light from that sun, while it pours downward upon 
the sphere of magnitudes (that is, of Matter) the light playing about itself 
which is generated from its own nature” (V.3.9). So, to use the two analogies 
that Plotinus oft utilized, the Nous is the image of the One, and the soul the 
image of the Nous; or the Nous is like a ray of sun from the One, and the soul 
is sunlight of the Nous.  
 In Origen, the substance by which God creates, in relation to the two 
other persons of the Trinity, is Ex Deo. The Father begets Jesus, and then the 
Holy Spirit is thus created, all out of his own eternal substance. In Plotinus, 
the One emanates the Nous, then the Nous creates the soul, and the lesser 
realm of matter, in its own image or reflection. Yet how does MacDonald 
compare?
 Dale Nelson states categorically, “MacDonald and Boehme believe 
God dwells in nature, and that nature proceeds from God, rather than being 
created out of nothing” (Nelson 1989:28). Rolland Hein explains how 
MacDonald rejects the traditional view of creation, “Man in his subconscious 
being, therefore, does not exist independently from God. God made man out 
of himself . . . and man lives and moves and has his being in God . . . Thus 
MacDonald repudiates the doctrine of creation Ex Nihilo which Augustine 
taught, and which many orthodox theologians have believed” (Hein 1989:47). 
 In MacDonald’s Castle Parable, one of his characters prays, “We 
thank thee that we have a father, and not a maker; that thou hast begotten us, 
and not moulded us as images of clay; that we have come forth of thy heart, 
and have not been fashioned by thy hands. It must be so. Only the heart of a 
father is able to create. We rejoice in it, and bless thee that we know it. We 
thank thee for thyself. Be what thou art—our root and life, our beginning and 
end, our all in all”  (MacDonald 1999:233). While it seems like MacDonald’s 
doctrine of creation stands in stark contrast to the Biblical account of Gen 
2:7 and 3:19, he argues that his view of creation Ex Deo is Biblically based. 
We find an explication of MacDonald’s theory of creation in his commentary 
of Romans 8:19 where the scripture reads “For the creation waits with eager 
longing for the revealing of the sons of God.” MacDonald comments on the 
Biblical passage, “I am inclined to believe the apostle regarded the whole 
visible creation as, in far differing degrees of consciousness, a live outcome 
from the heart of the living one, who is all in all” (MacDonald 2012b:90). 
In A Dish of Orts MacDonald explains, “In the New Testament there is a 
higher form used to express the relation in which we stand to him- ‘we are his 
offspring;’ not the work of his hand, but the children that came forth from his 
heart” (MacDonald 1895:246). 
 In survey of MacDonald’s doctrine of creation, it would appear as 
though he believed that the entire physical world was Ex Deo, “Our own poet 
Goldsmith, with the high instinct of genius, speaks of God having ‘loved 
us into being.’ Now I think this is not only true with regard to man, but true 
likewise with regard to the world in which we live. [It’s] not merely a thing 
which God hath made . . . but is an expression of the thought, the feeling, the 
heart of God himself” (MacDonald 1895:246). But in other areas, he suggests 
that his doctrine may be more limited: “Perhaps the precious things of the 
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earth, the coal and the diamonds, the iron and clay and gold, may be said 
to have come from his hands; but the live things come from his heart- from 
near the same region whence ourselves we came” (MacDonald 2012a:278). 
It’s possible that he still continued to hold the entire world as a creation out 
of the heart of God, but simply would not argue the point. Yet the concept 
that living beings were Ex Deo was worthy of dispute. So again, in his 
commentary on Romans 8:19:  “Such view, at the same time, I do not care 
to insist upon; I only care to argue that the word creature or creation must 
include everything in creation that has sentient life” (MacDonald 2012b:90). 
 In further research, it appears as if, for MacDonald, there is no third 
option: either God created out of himself or there is no God. For God must 
either exist, and we are created out of Him, or he does not exist at all, and 
we have spontaneously come into existence out of nothingness. “If we came 
out of nothing, we could not invent the idea of a God—could we, Robert? 
Nothing would be our God. If we come from God, nothing is more natural, 
nothing so natural, as to want him, and when we have not got him, to try to 
find him.—What if he should be in us after all, and working in us this way? 
just this very way of crying out after him?” (MacDonald 2005:277). And 
again he explains, “Only, if man and Nature came both out of nothing, why 
should they not be nothing to each other? Why should not man be nothing to 
himself?” (MacDonald 1991:260). MacDonald saw creation out of nothing 
as an illogical phrase, “There is a false phrase used, that we were made out 
of nothing. It is a mere logical contradiction” (MacDonald 2009a:121).  If 
there was truly “nothing,” God would not exist, thus God would not be 
there to create. To consider these ideas more deeply, consider this extended 
passage from The Dish of Orts (MacDonald 1895:3) in an entry entitled “The 
Imagination”: 
Poet means maker. We must not forget, however, that between creator 
and poet lies the one unpassable gulf which distinguishes—far be 
it from us to say divides—all that is God’s from all that is man’s; 
a gulf teeming with infinite revelations, but a gulf over which no 
man can pass to find out God, although God needs not to pass over 
it to find man; the gulf between that which calls, and that which is 
thus called into being; between that which makes in its own image 
and that which is made in that image. It is better to keep the word 
creation for that calling out of nothing which is the imagination of 
God; except it be as an occasional symbolic expression, whose daring 
is fully recognized, of the likeness of man’s work to the work of his 
maker. The necessary unlikeness between the creator and the created 
holds within it the equally necessary likeness of the thing made to 
him who makes it, and so of the work of the made to the work of the 
maker. When therefore, refusing to employ the word creation of the 
work of man, we yet use the word imagination of the work of God, 
we cannot be said to dare at all. It is only to give the name of man’s 
faculty to that power after which and by which it was fashioned. The 
imagination of man is made in the image of the imagination of God. 
Everything of man must have been of God first; and it will help much 
towards our understanding of the imagination and its functions in 
man if we first succeed in regarding aright the imagination of God, in 
which the imagination of man lives and moves and has its being. 
In the passage above, MacDonald has no qualms stating that when God 
created, he called us out of nothing. At first understanding, one may find it 
contentious that here he makes no qualms in using Ex Nihilo style language, 
yet, it must be firmly denoted that MacDonald qualifies the word “nothing” 
as the “imagination of God.” In MacDonald’s view, God created from his 
imagination. God called his creatures, which did not pre-exist, nor are made 
of God’s own essence, into existence. 
 One must wonder why MacDonald used the verbiage “He makes 
them, not out of nothing, but out of Himself” in most of his passages 
on creation. This idea was not a fleeting concept that arose once in 
MacDonald’s mind, then passed on. MacDonald specifically, and I would 
argue intentionally, used this wording in many of his books. I contend that 
this diction was used for two specific reasons: First, MacDonald wanted 
to demonstrate and remind us that God’s creative process is quite different 
and much more glorious then when man, figuratively, “brings things into 
existence.” As MacDonald explained, “Better to keep the word creation for 
that calling out of nothing which is the imagination of God; except it be as 
an occasional symbolic expression” (MacDonald 1895:3). No man creates 
something out of his heart in the same way that God does. When the poet 
uses the term “create,” it can only be used analogically. As Gisela Kreglinger 
writes, “He goes out of his way to differentiate clearly between the creative 
activity of God and human creativity. MacDonald establishes God as the one 
who created the world out of nothing and mankind as part of God’s creation” 
(Kreglinger 2014:84) and ask MacDonald continuously implores, “God 
thinks you out of himself” (MacDonald 2009a:106).
 Secondly, MacDonald often wanted to remind the reader of the 
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direct and intimate relational ties between God and his creation. As will be 
researched later, MacDonald was a Christian mystic who accentuated God’s 
immanence and fatherhood.  Man is no mere accident of nature, but is the 
offspring of God.  In MacDonald’s own words, “For God is the heritage of 
the soul in the ownness of origin; man is the offspring of his making will, of 
his life; God himself is his birth-place; God is the self that makes the soul 
able to say I too, I myself. This absolute unspeakable bliss of the creature is 
that for which the Son died, for which the Father suffered with him. Then 
only is life itself; then only is it right, is it one; then only is it as designed 
and necessitated by the eternal life-outgiving Life” (MacDonald 2012a:189).  
David Robb illustrates this intimacy, “His belief that the world is a book, 
given pattern and significance by a writer-god . . . [suggests] the nearness and 
intimacy which MacDonald sought for in his understanding of God” (Robb 
1987:53). 
 Lastly, it must be noted that some casual readers of MacDonald 
falsely conclude that being created “out of God’s own heart” indicates 
that he was a pantheist. While the following section will focus on that 
specific research, it can be stated here that MacDonald categorically did not 
indicate in any of his works that creation Ex Deo was a dissemination, or an 
emanation, of God’s essence into his creation.  Not even Origen or Plotinus 
suggests such a strong emanationism, yet MacDonald is sometimes credited 
with this position, albeit without merit. While it is still legitimate to claim 
that MacDonald held to creation Ex Deo, but not in the traditional sense of 
the term. Like many of his other assessments, his view of creation was not 
ontological in nature, but rather, MacDonald’s Ex Deo was focused on the 
primacy and the complexity of God’s creative, imaginative process, as well as 
the relational implications of creator and his new creation. 
Section III:  “Participation” in the Divine Nature
 Any attempt to formally categorize George MacDonald’s theological 
perspective generally results in consternation and even robust dialogue 
amongst MacDonald scholars. But an attempt should be made here, not to 
explicate his entire theological system, but merely to set forth his view of 
humanity’s relation to the divine. Even then, with the focus narrowed to this 
specific topic, there are reasons for confusion in his reader’s opinions. One of 
the main causes of misunderstanding is an equivocation of terminology, and 
the confusing explanations of these terms in MacDonald’s work as well as the 
work of modern MacDonald scholarship. 
 First, and most importantly, while George MacDonald knew that 
the term “pantheism” had heretical implications, he had no problems with 
categorizing his protagonists as pantheistic. For instance, in MacDonald’s 
What’s Mine’s Mine (2000:211), one of the characters considers the idea that 
quite possibly, the protagonist is a pantheist: 
“The thought, IS HE A PANTHEIST? took its place. Had she not 
surprised him in an act of worship? In that wide outspreading of 
the lifted arms, was he not worshipping the whole, the Pan? Sky 
and stars and mountains and sea were his God! She walked aghast, 
forgetful of a hundred things she had heard him say that might have 
settled the point. She had, during the last day or two, been reading an 
article in which pantheism was once and again referred to with more 
horror than definiteness. Recovering herself a little, she ventured 
approach to the subject. ‘There! that is what I was afraid of!’ cried 
Mercy: ‘you are pantheists!’”
The disdain for pantheism rings true in the passage, but the protagonist does 
something unexpected; he agrees that he is, in fact, a pantheist. But he does 
so on his own terms, and by his own definition, “‘Yes,’ answered Ian. ‘If to 
believe that not a lily can grow, not a sparrow fall to the ground without our 
Father, be pantheism, Alister and I are pantheists. If by pantheism you mean 
anything that would not fit with that, we are not pantheists.’ (MacDonald 
2000:215).
 What was the point of this maneuver? Why use a word that would 
spark such talk of heresy? It would seem that MacDonald merely wanted to 
champion the love of nature, and to lessen the disdain for those secularists 
who emulated that love. MacDonald lectured at one point, “The feeling used 
to be so strong in these northern parts, that if you talked about nature with 
anything like enthusiasm, you were worshipping a heathen goddess.  Friends, 
it is rank paganism--worse than paganism.  The devil did not make the 
moonlight, nor did God place us here to strive against the lovely influences of 
sea and land and sky amid which He has set us.  The man who loves nature 
aright is a good man—a man of tender heart” (Gregs 2013:290-1, italics 
mine). 
 Another complication of the issue is that George MacDonald often 
used pantheistic language, and was a lover of nature himself. Greville 
MacDonald records one of George’s letters where he contends, “The 
beautiful things round about you are the expression of God’s face, or, as in 
Faust, the garment whereby we see the deity. Is God’s sun more beautiful 
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than God himself? Has he not left it to us as a symbol of his own life-giving 
light?” (Greville MacDonald 2005:122). In one instance, MacDonald even 
goes so far as calling nature “she,”  “we talk even of the world which is 
but [God’s] living garment, as if that were a person; and we call it “she” as 
if it were a woman, because so many of God’s loveliest influences come 
to us through her. She always seems to me a beautiful old grandmother” 
(MacDonald 2000:212). But due to these personifications of nature and use 
of poetic, pantheistic terminology, MacDonald’s words could be easily taken 
out of context and twisted into something that the author did not mean. For 
instance, in an Unspoken Sermon, MacDonald wrote that for the Christian, 
“the life of the Father and the Son flows through him; he is a part of the 
divine organism” (MacDonald 2012a:197).  In his “A Sketch of Individual 
Development” MacDonald contends that “oneness with God is the sole truth 
of humanity” (MacDonald 1895:74). In a letter he plainly writes, “We know 
in ourselves that we are one with God” (Greville MacDonald 2005:432). 
But if the reader does not read the context, or attempt to understand what 
MacDonald meant by being a part of the “divine organism” or in what sense 
can we attain “oneness” with God, then the reader could falsely conclude that 
MacDonald was a thoroughgoing pantheist. 
 This pantheistic vocabulary and decontextualization does not affect 
just MacDonald, but his scholars as well. Rolland Hein writes in his The 
Harmony Within, “Humanity, when it realizes its highest spiritual potential, 
will differ in nowise from divinity” (Hein 1989:71). If the reader had not read 
previous pages which included Hein’s discussion on human individuality and 
uniqueness, and had read this passage as a mere sound-bite, pantheism could 
have been concluded.  William Raeper says that MacDonald’s religion 
“involves the soul seeking a union with God—a union of substances in fact . . . 
a union in which the individuality is retained” (Raeper 1987:257). Raeper’s 
commentary is unique, especially since he explains that this union between 
God and man to be substantial. It would seem that he is unquestionably 
suggesting that MacDonald was a pantheist, but in the next paragraph he 
writes that “MacDonald believed in a union in which the individuality was 
retained” (Raeper 1987:257). While Raeper’s explanation of the unifying 
principle is nonexistent in this text, for it was not the overall point Raeper 
was making, our point is clear: due to MacDonald’s own use of pantheistic 
language, as well as his scholarship, some have falsely attributed pantheism 
to our subject. 
 Lastly, and likely most importantly, MacDonald championed, on 
numerous occasions, the title “Christian pantheist.” It should be noted that 
this designation should not be unique merely because of the baggage that 
comes with this terminology, but simply due to the fact that it was rare to 
have MacDonald advocate any title at all. He was infamous for intentionally 
avoiding labeling his theological and doctrinal perspective, as he is oft 
quoted, “Jesus Christ is my theology, and nothing else” (Anonymous 
2012:31). 
 Most of MacDonald’s significant explanations on Christian 
Pantheism are contained within his discussions on Wordsworth. Note the 
positive light in which MacDonald casts this idea, “This Christian pantheism, 
this belief that God is in everything, and showing himself in everything, has 
been much brought to the light by the poets of the past generation, and has its 
influence still, I hope, upon the poets of the present” (MacDonald 1895:246). 
As was defined in What’s Mine’s Mine (MacDonald 2000:211), MacDonald 
defined his Christian pantheism as a theology where God is overwhelmingly 
immanent. Greville reiterates this concept, “Take Lessons for a Child as 
expression of his pantheism: a word I use in Wordsworthian sense, and 
antithetic to any crude theory that, admitting God’s manifestation in natural 
phenomena, denies His personality and transcendent, creating presence—and 
there an end of it. George MacDonald’s pantheism was faith in the Father 
of all life, whose living word perpetually creates, inspires and redeems the 
whole world” (Greville MacDonald 2005:278-9). While Greville uses the 
term pantheism, he strictly points out that this is no “crude theory” which 
“denies his personality,” so how was this term to be interpreted? 
 While the term “pantheist” brings its own import into the minds of 
the reader, there is no doubt that MacDonald did not mean to use the term 
in the normative sense, indicating this alteration with the prefix “Christian.” 
Kerry Dearborn explains, “MacDonald identified Wordsworth’s orientation 
as ‘Christian Pantheism,’ but cautions that it does not follow that he was an 
apostle of nature who identified nature with God. Rather, nature was seen 
as ‘the word of God in his own handwriting’ or ‘the expression of the face 
of God’ which has a ‘moulding’ and formative effect. Because nature was 
considered part of the overflow of God’s love, it could draw one back to a 
more vibrant perspective on all of life and offer a corrective to mechanistic 
ways of approaching relationships, theology, and life” (Dearborn 2006:36-
37). In his own words MacDonald explains why the love of nature should be 
applauded, “When we understand the Word of God, then we understand the 
works of God; when we know the nature of an artist, we know his pictures; 
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when we have known and talked with the poet, we understand his poetry far 
better. To the man of God, all nature will be but changeful reflections of the 
face of God” (MacDonald 1895:256). MacDonald did argue, as stated by 
Paul in Ephesians 2:23 and 4:10, that “If there be a God, he is all in all, and 
filleth all things, and all is well” (MacDonald 1881:310). But MacDonald 
did not equate God and the world. For instance, in a letter to Lady Byron on 
the topic of Arthurian legend, “But finding God in Christ, he found God in 
all things-as certainly, though not so fully manifest” (Greville MacDonald 
2005:311). He made the distinction between the God-man, and nature itself, 
showing that MacDonald must exert some distinction between nature and 
God. 
 In addition to a separation between God and nature, MacDonald 
was clear that God and man were quite distinct. Kerry Dearborn explains, 
“MacDonald was careful to acknowledge a radical difference between God 
and humanity. He held firmly to belief in God’s sovereignty and freedom. In 
this way he averted the Romantic inclination toward pantheism” (Dearborn 
2006:79). In his own words, he explains without equivocation, “He only 
is the true, original good; I am true because I seek nothing but his will. He 
only is all in all; I am not all in all, but he is my father, and I am the son in 
whom his heart of love is satisfied” (MacDonald 2012a:195).  For clarity 
and emphasis, MacDonald specifically stated above “I am not all in all.” 
He realizes that he cannot be God, he is not all-in-all, but there still can be 
oneness, in a sense. 
 While MacDonald obviously was not a pantheist in the normative 
sense, it’s obvious that he argued that there was a deep connection between 
God and his creation. Kerry Dearborn concedes, “MacDonald also affirmed 
an innate connection between God the Creator and human creatures, for 
humans are created in God’s image” (Dearborn 2006:79). This depth of 
connection was often, in MacDonald’s writings, called “oneness,” which 
may cause some to assume pantheism. Yet the following will make clear that 
while there can be “oneness,” this concept of oneness cannot happen without 
multiplicity. In an Unspoken Sermon, MacDonald contends that “the final end 
of the separation is not individuality; that is but a means to it; the final end is 
oneness—an impossibility without it. For there can be no unity, no delight of 
love, no harmony, no good in being, where there is but one. Two at least are 
needed for oneness; and the greater the number of individuals, the greater, the 
lovelier, the richer, the diviner is the possible unity” (2012a:140). The next 
pertinent question revolves around MacDonald’s concept of “oneness” and 
how one can be, as Peter put it in 2 Peter 2:4, a partaker of the divine nature. 
 MacDonald writes, “We must choose to be divine, to be of God, to be 
one with God, loving and living as he loves and lives, and so be partakers of 
the divine nature, or we perish” (MacDonald 2012a:194).  Thus, MacDonald 
does not argue that to be of the divine nature is, in fact, a part of our nature. 
In other words, it is not a metaphysical unity; it is a volitional one. Humanity 
can only choose to be unified with God. This concept in MacDonald’s 
work recurs so consistently it may not be an exaggeration to state that he 
thought it one of his most important ideas to disclose to his readers. Firstly, 
in contrast to the strong Calvinistic determinism during MacDonald’s time, 
he regarded the will of man to be the pinnacle of his personhood, “For the 
highest creation of God in man is his will, and until the highest in man meets 
the highest in God, their true relation is not a spiritual fact” (MacDonald 
2012b:9-10).  Thus, when this will is unified with God’s will, the man 
becomes a partaker of the divine: 
The highest in man is neither his intellect nor his imagination nor 
his reason; all are inferior to his will, and indeed, in a grand way, 
dependent upon it, his will must meet God’s-a will distinct from 
God’s, else were no harmony possible between them. Not the less, 
therefore, but the more, is all God’s. For God creates in the man the 
power to will His will. It may cost God a suffering man can never 
know, to bring the man to the point at which he will will His will, but 
when he is brought to that point, and declares for the truth, that is, for 
the will of God, he becomes one with God, and the end of God in the 
man’s creation, the end for which Jesus was born and died, is gained. 
(MacDonald 2012b:10)
This concept is echoed in his Unspoken Sermons where he explains how 
man can have a “willed harmony of dual oneness—with the All-in-all. When 
a man can and does entirely say, ‘Not my will, but thine be done’—when 
he so wills the will of God as to do it, then is he one with God—one, as 
a true son with a true father” (MacDonald 2012a:145). As well where he 
writes, “We are not and cannot become true sons without our will willing his 
will, our doing-following his making” (MacDonald 2012a:194). There are 
multiple repetitions of this idea in MacDonald’s works, some of which are 
more controversial, for instance where he suggests that by willing God’s will 
that we can be “part of the divine organism” (MacDonald 2012a:197).  The 
wording “divine organism” may cause one to stumble, but there is no doubt, 
after reading the foregoing passages, that MacDonald only mean this in an 
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analogical, and not in a metaphysical fashion. 
 In a different twist, and to be complete in our understanding of 
contemporary modern scholarship, one MacDonald expert has a unique 
perspective.  Bonnie Gaarden, in her The Christian Goddess places 
MacDonald under the category of “panentheism.” She defines this term as 
“the notion that God is expressed but not contained in nature, is immanent as 
well as transcendent, is more familiar to modern theologians under the term 
‘panentheism.’   [It is] spread through the theology of Thomas Aquinas, that 
the regularities we call the ‘laws of nature’ are not imposed by God from 
outside, but are an external manifestation of the divine reason that animates 
nature” (Gaarden 2011:7).  This terminology, similarly to pantheism, carries 
with it some historical baggage. The panentheism of Alfred Whitehead, for 
instance, is defined as one where “the universe as we know it requires a basic 
reality, God, that both grounds and participates in its development” (Cooper 
2006:165). Thus in classical panentheism, God exists, but is in the process 
of becoming, and thus, changing along with the natural world. But this does 
not seem to be the modern panentheism mentioned by Gaarden, especially 
since she mentioned Thomas Aquinas as a panentheist, a denotation that is 
not uttered among Thomistic or Panentheistic scholars (Cooper 2006:327). 
This is likely due to the possibility that Gaarden was not speaking of classical 
panentheism, but modern panentheism. Yet this modern panentheism sounds 
quite similar to what MacDonald entitled “Christian Pantheism.” Thus 
Gaarden is merely exchanging one term with historical baggage with another 
term with it’s own set of subconscious import. 
 Instead of using a word charged with hints of heresy, this researcher 
recommends a term which upholds MacDonald’s theological orthodoxy, but 
would highlight the uniqueness of the MacDonald’s vision. Thus we will 
adopt the term “sacramentalism” which has been used by such scholars as 
Robert Trexler, Kirsten Jeffrey Johnson, Rolland Hein, as well as alluded 
to by MacDonald himself. As already quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, Trexler lists MacDonald along with other “sacramentalist writers, 
who see nature as reflecting God’s truth” (Trexler 2014). Kirsten Jeffrey 
Johnson gives some explanation of how his Scottish upbringing likely had 
a strong influence on his sacramentalism,  “Recorded Highland prayers 
reveal a people who saw a relational Triune God involved in everything 
from the weather to their laundry to their husbandry. This conviction of 
an all-encompassing, all-relating God who loves bodies and souls, the 
world and humanity’s positive interaction within it, is woven throughout 
MacDonald’s work” (Johnson 2011:33). Thus, MacDonald’s view holds 
that “the sacramental does not recognize a division between earthly and 
holy: earthiness is holiness, by definition of the Creator’s own act” (Johnson 
2011:239). So, it would be proper “use the term ‘sacramental,’ in a very broad 
sense, to describe MacDonald’s view of God’s relation to both the world of 
nature and the world of event and circumstance” (Hein 1989:44). 
 In MacDonald’s own words he offered an analogy to help us 
understand the relationship of God to his creation in The Portent, “The very 
outside of a book had a charm to me. It was a kind of sacrament-an outward 
sign of an inward and spiritual grace; as, indeed, what on God’s earth is not?” 
(MacDonald 1999:45). Thus, all of the earth is a sacrament, and is a symbol 
of God and his characteristics. Again, this terminology removes the possible 
heretical import, and focuses on the Biblical concept of God’s immanence 
and revelatory creation (Romans 1:20). In even more detail, MacDonald 
explains “all about us, in earth and air, wherever eye or ear can reach, there 
is a power ever breathing itself forth in signs, now in a daisy, now in a 
windwaft, a cloud, a sunset; a power that holds constant and sweetest relation 
with the dark and silent world within us; that the same God who is in us, 
and upon whose tree we are the buds, if not yet the flowers, also is all about 
us—inside, the Spirit; outside, the Word. And the two are ever trying to meet 
in us; and when they meet, then the sign without, and the longing within, 
become one in light, and the man no more walketh in darkness, but knoweth 
whither he goeth” (MacDonald 2002:415). Thus God is utterly immanent, 
within us and out, and his Holy Spirit and his Word symbolically connect 
within us to produce and emanate forth his light. 
 In conclusion, while MacDonald usually carried an attitude of 
disdain for philosophy and theology, there is no doubt that the research 
above reveals that he did, in fact, hold to a specific philosophy and doctrine, 
and was concerned with the public holding beliefs that were contrary to his 
own, not due to intellectual arrogance, but because he believed these beliefs 
would negatively affect their relationship with God. This train of thought 
will be more thoroughly elucidated in part three. At this point it can be stated 
unequivocally that MacDonald was a true metaphysical realist who operated 
under the shadow of Platonism, who held to his own interpretation of creation 
Ex Deo in regards to God’s relational character and imagination and not 
emanationism, and who believed in a purely theistic God under the tradition 
of “sacramentalism.”
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